Exponential-Family Random Graph Models for Rank-Order Relational Data by Krivitsky, Pavel N. & Butts, Carter T.
Exponential-Family Random Graph Models
for Rank-Order Relational Data
Pavel N. Krivitsky∗ Carter T. Butts†
Abstract
Rank-order relational data, in which each actor ranks the others ac-
cording to some criterion, often arise from sociometric measurements
of judgment (e.g., self-reported interpersonal interaction) or preference
(e.g., relative liking). We propose a class of exponential-family mod-
els for rank-order relational data and derive a new class of sufficient
statistics for such data, which assume no more than within-subject
ordinal properties. Application of MCMC MLE to this family allows
us to estimate effects for a variety of plausible mechanisms governing
rank structure in cross-sectional context, and to model the evolution
of such structures over time. We apply this framework to model the
evolution of relative liking judgments in an acquaintance process, and
to model recall of relative volume of interpersonal interaction among
members of a technology education program.
1 Introduction
Rank-order sociometric data—in which each actor in a network ranks the
others according to some criterion—have a long history in the social sciences.
Among many, many other instances, Sampson (1968) famously asked each of
18 novitiates in a monastery to rank his three most liked novitiates among
the other 17; Newcomb (1961) measured evolving rankings of each other by
17 men living in fraternity-style housing over the course of a semester; and,
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more recently, Wave I of National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
asked high school students to list, in order, up to 5 male and up to 5 female
friends (Harris et al. 2003). While many network processes (e.g., diffusion,
brokerage, exchange) are only sensibly posited for networks with categorical
or ratio scale relationship states, many others—particularly those involving
personal preferences (e.g., liking, advice-seeking)—are much more readily
represented ordinally, and, indeed, may not even have interval, ratio, or
categorical meaning across raters. This last can be true even when data is not
collected in an explicitly ordinal fashion. For instance, Johnson, Boster, and
Palinkas (2003) asked personnel in an isolated environment (the Amundsen–
Scott South Pole Station) to rate their degree of interaction with each other
on a 0–10 scale, with 0 indicating no interaction and 10 indicating a “great
deal” of interaction. While it is reasonable to assume that such ratings are
ordinally coherent within rater (e.g., if Bob rates Sally below Jill, then Bob
regards himself as interacting more with Jill than with Sally), such ratings
cannot be compared across raters: if Bob rates his interaction with Jill at 4,
and Sally rates her interaction with Jill at 6, we have no basis for concluding
that Sally’s interaction with Jill is stronger than Bob’s. Such interaction
rating data is thus “local” to the rater, and must be analyzed in a manner
that avoids cross-rater comparisons.
As the above suggests, much valued sociometric data based on individual
ratings or judgments poses issues akin to explicit rank-order data. Indeed, is
common practice in statistics to reduce data with unknown or problematic
distributional form to ranks for nonparametric analyses such as Kruskal–
Wallis and Mann–Whitney procedures, and similar use may be made of ranks
in networks with valued ties as a compromise between analyzing tie values
as they are and dichotomizing them (Newcomb 1961:32–34, for example).
Where there is no objective basis for equating or ordering tie values across
raters, such treatment of valued network data reduces to the rank-order data
case.
The most common approach taken to analyzing rank-valued network data
in current practice is to dichotomize ranks into binary ties, defining a tie to
be present if a given ego had ranked a given alter above a certain cut-off and
absent otherwise. Many methods of dichotomizing have been proposed. For
instance, cut-offs have been set at a particular rank (e.g., top 5) (Breiger,
Boorman, and Arabie 1975; White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976; Arabie,
Boorman, and Levitt 1978; Wasserman 1980; Pattison 1982; Harris et al.
2003, for example); at a particular quantile (e.g., top 50%) (Krackhardt
2
and Handcock 2007); or have been found adaptively (Doreian, Kapuscinski,
Krackhardt, and Szczypula 1996). Another common approach is to focus on
rank correlations and on treating ranks on an additive scale (Newcomb 1956;
Nakao and Romney 1993).
These approaches come with significant limitations. Dichotomizing ties
requires a threshold point to be selected, inevitably discarding information
and possibly introducing biases (Thomas and Blitzstein 2011), while meth-
ods like rank correlation are limited to simple comparisons and cannot, for
example, be used to examine the strength of one social factor after control-
ling for the effects of another. More importantly, these techniques implicitly
assume that tie values can be equated across raters, an assumption that is
often unjustified. When the presence of an (i, j) tie has a different empiri-
cal meaning than the presence of a (k, j) tie, conventional network analytic
techniques (e.g., centrality indices) may prove misleading.
Modeling frameworks explicitly designed for rank-order data would ad-
dress these limitations, but to date work on model-based approaches to rank-
order network data has been very limited. Gormley and Murphy (2008), for
instance, use a generalization of the Plackett–Luce model (Plackett 1975) in
a latent position framework to model what can be viewed as a bipartite rank-
order network of affiliations from voters to candidates in Irish proportional
representation through the single transferable vote elections. Null models
for comparison of rank-order (or otherwise valued) data structures were de-
veloped by Hubert (1987), and model-based extensions of this approach for
comparison of multiple structures have been introduced by Butts (2007a).
(See also related work on null hypothesis testing in a network regression con-
text, e.g., that of Krackhardt (1987) and Dekker, Krackhardt, and Snijders
(2007).) This latter work is focused on modeling degrees of correspondence
between relational structures, and does not attempt to model the internal
properties of rank-valued networks themselves. This second problem is the
focus of the present paper.
For modeling of internal network structure, exponential-family random
graph (ERG) or p∗ models (Holland and Leinhardt 1981; Wasserman and
Pattison 1996; Robins, Pattison, and Wasserman 1999) are the currently fa-
vored approach. Models parameterized in this way have been applied to so-
cial network data in a variety of contexts, including dichotomized rank-order
data (Krackhardt and Handcock 2007; Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris 2008b);
used in this latter capacity, they inherit the difficulties with dichotomizing
noted above. Robins et al. (1999) were the first to introduce a systematic
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treatment of ERGMs for categorically valued network data, along with pro-
cedures for approximate inference using pseudo-likelihood estimation. The
model families they propose can be used when edge values are ordinal in
an absolute sense, but assume (1) that values can be meaningfully equated
across raters, and (2) that there is a well-defined zero-value indicating the
absence of a tie, that is qualitatively different from other possible tie values
(and, per (1), equivalent across raters). Building on this work, Krivitsky
(2012) formulated a generalized framework for exponential-family models on
networks whose ties have values (categorical or otherwise) and introduced
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for simulation and maximum-
likelihood inference in this more general case. This formulation provides a
basis for generalizing to models of the kind we consider here, but retains the
assumption of “absolute” edge values that have a constant meaning across
raters.
In this paper, we develop ERG models for “locally” ordinal relational data
in which ratings cannot be directly compared across subjects; we focus on
the foundational case of complete rankings, but introduce model terms that
can be used with more general models (e.g., for partial orders). In Section 2,
we discuss representation of ordinal relational data and introduce the proba-
bilistic framework for exponential-family models for them, and in Section 3,
we describe statistics that can be used to model common network properties
within this framework. We discuss issues involved in implementation and
statistical inference on these models in Section 4. Two applications of this
framework are demonstrated in Section 5.
2 Exponential-Family Framework for Ordinal
Relational Data
2.1 Actors, Rankings, and Comparisons
We begin this section by defining notation for representation of ordinal re-
lational data and by establishing basic principles for using such data in a
manner that respects its intrinsic measurement properties.
Consider a set of n actors of interest, N , whom we index asN = {A,B,C, . . . }.
Each actor in N will be a rater in our network of interest; except as noted
otherwise, the objects being rated by each rater are the other members of
N (though we will consider other possibilities in Section 6.1). For vari-
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ous purposes, it will be helpful to have specific notation to refer to the
set of possible p-tuples of distinct actors in N ; we refer to this as the pth
“distinct Cartesian power” of N . Recall that the pth (ordinary) Carte-
sian power of a set N is the set of all ordered p-tuples of individuals from
N . For example, if N = {A,B,C}, then second Cartesian power of N
is N2 = {(A,A), (A,B), (A,C), (B,A), (B,B), (B,C), (C,A), (C,B), (C,C)}.
By analogy, we denote the pth distinct Cartesian power of N (the set contain-
ing all p-tuples of N whose elements do not repeat) by Np 6= ⊂ Np.1 Follow-
ing our example, then, the second distinct Cartesian power of N is given by
N26= = {(A,A), (A,B), (A,C), (B,A),(B,B), (B,C), (C,A), (C,B),(C,C)}.
As discussed in the introduction, our data consist of observations in which
each actor (ego) in the network i ∈ N provides some ranking or ordering of
the other actors (alters), and, possibly, of himself or herself. In other words,
each actor i defines an ordinal relation
i over set N . This relation could
represent “preferred to”, “interacted more with than”, “judged to be taller
than”, or any other judgment of interest. Importantly, we note that for two
egos i and j,
i need not equal j, and the ratings of some alter k by i and
j cannot be compared directly; we may, however, meaningfully ask whether,
e.g. (k
i l) = (k j l)—whether i and j’s rankings of k and l are concordant,
and our modeling framework is founded on exactly these distinctions.
A simple example of a ranking structure is provided in Figure 1, in which
actor A (ego) ranks (alter) D above B and C and C above B. In our above
notation, this corresponds to D A C, C A B, and D A B. The presence of
corresponding structures associated with Egos B, C, and D (not illustrated,
but shown in the rank matrix of Figure 1, right) results in a complete ordinal
network.
In general, we make few assumptions regarding
i. Assuming the ego may
not include self in the ranking, we require that for all ego–alter–alter triples
(i, j, k) ∈ N36=, i reports either j i k or j i k. With the additional assump-
tion of transitivity (j
i k ∧ k i l =⇒ j i l), the above formulation leads
to representing a partial ordering of alters by each ego. If incomparability is
also transitive (j
i k ∧ k i l =⇒ j i l), a weak ordering results, which
may be used to represent rank data in which “ties” are allowed. Finally, a
further constraint on
i that j i k =⇒ k i j results in a complete ordering,
which may arise when an ego is forced to rank all of the alters with no equal
1In formal notation, this can be written as Np 6= ≡ {v ∈ Np : ∀i∈{1 .. p}∀j∈{1 .. p}i 6=
j =⇒ vi 6= vj}.
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ABCD ≻ ≻
B
C
D
⟹
⟹
Pairwise Comparisons:
Comparison Matrix
Rank Matrix
⇒
⇒
A:
B:
C:
D:
Rank:
N/A
1
2
3
Figure 1: Ego A’s report regarding her ranking of B, C, and D can be en-
coded as a rank ordering or as pairwise comparisons. Here, Ego A’s response
ranks D highest, then C, then B. We may encode this report by assigning
a rank of 1 to B, 2 to C, and 3 to D resulting in a row of rank matrix y·,·;
or we may consider all pairwise comparisons implied by A: that D is ranked
over C, D is ranked over B, and C is ranked over B, and the opposite does
not hold, resulting in a binary matrix of comparison indicators yA: ··. Here,
boxes () denote matrix entries that are unobservable and/or meaningless:
in this case, these include A’s row and column entries in the comparison
matrix and the diagonal of the rank matrix, because A is not permitted to
rank herself among the others; and the diagonal of the comparison matrix,
because it is meaningless to compare an alter to himself or herself.
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ranks permitted. This is an important special case, and we consider it here
in more detail.
We will, furthermore, focus on the case where the ego does not report
a ranking for self and where the set of egos is the same as the set of alters
(e.g., people ranking other people who rank them in turn, as opposed to e.g.
consumers ranking brands or other objects), so relation j
i k is meaningful
only for (i, j, k) ∈ N36=. If an ego is permitted to rank itself among the others,
it is also possible for j or k (but not both) to equal i: (i, j, k) ∈ N × N26=,
and if we call the set of people in the people-ranking-objects scenario Ne and
the set of objects Na, then (i, j, k) ∈ Ne × N26=a . This last case is discussed
further in Section 6.1.
Rankings are not assumed to be comparable across egos: for each ego i,
we may only say that one alter is “
i” another (or that this does not hold). To
concisely represent this fundamental operation in a specific ordinal network
y, we define an indicator
yi: jk ≡
{
1 if j
i k i.e., i ranks j above k;
0 otherwise.
(1)
This represents the basic distinction that can be unequivocally made from
locally ordinal data. As we shall see in Section 3, being limited to such
statements does not prevent us from specifying a very rich class of models.
2.2 Representations of Ordinal Networks
We make use of two numerical representations of the observed networks of
rankings, which we illustrate on toy networks with n = 4: a network of
complete orderings y in Figure 2a and a network of idiosyncratic ranking
structures y? in Figure 3. Figure 2 also shows representations of two pertur-
bations ((b) and (c)) of y. We make use of them in subsequent sections on
model terms and interpretations.
Firstly, a network of complete or a weak ordering y may be encoded
simply as a row in an n × n-matrix of ranks that we denote y·,·, with yi,j
being the rank by ego i of alter j. Consider the ranking structure in network
y in Figure 2a. As illustrated in Figure 1, the ranking reported by Ego A
can be expressed by assigning the highest possible rank n− 1 = 3 to D, the
highest-ranked alter, n−2 = 2, to C, the alter with the next highest ranking,
and 1 to B, the actor with the lowest ranking. This representation is slightly
7
y Ranking: y·,·
A : D  C  B
B : D  C  A
C : A  B  D
D : B  C  A

 1 2 3
1  2 3
3 2  1
1 3 2 

yA: ·· yB: ·· yC: ·· yD: ··
   
  0 0
 1  0
 1 1 


  0 0
   
1   0
1  1 


 1  1
0   1
   
0 0  


 0 0 
1  1 
1 0  
   

(a) y: original network
yA:BC Ranking:
A : D  B  C
B : D  C  A
C : A  B  D
D : B  C  A
yA:BC·,· yA:BCA: ··
 2 1 3
1  2 3
3 2  1
1 3 2 


   
  1 0
 0  0
 1 1 

(b) yA:BC: Ego A swapped B and C
yA:BD Ranking:
A : B  C  D
B : D  C  A
C : A  B  D
D : B  C  A
yA:BD·,· yA:BDA: ··
 3 2 1
1  2 3
3 2  1
1 3 2 


   
  1 1
 0  1
 0 0 

(c) yA:BD: Ego A swapped B and D
Figure 2: Representations of complete rankings y and illustration of yi: jk
(defined in Section 3.1) for n = 4. Here, boxes () denote matrix entries
that are unobservable and/or meaningless. In yA:BC (b) and yA:BD (c),
pairwise comparison matrices yi: ·· for i other than A are unchanged from
those of y (a).
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y? Ranking: y?·,·
A : D ∼= C  B
B : A  B  C  D
C : B  C, A  D
D : A  B, B  C, C  A

 1 2 2
4 3 2 1
N/A
N/A

y?
A: ·· y
?
B: ·· y
?
C: ·· y
?
D: ··
   
  0 0
 1  0
 1 0 


 1 1 1
0  1 1
0 0  1
0 0 0 


 0 0 1
0  1 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 


 1 0 
0  1 
1 0  
   

Figure 3: Representations of idiosyncratic ordering structures for n = 4.
Here, boxes () denote matrix entries that are unobservable and/or mean-
ingless. Ego A does not rank C or D over one another but ranks both above
B, for a partial ordering; Ego B is permitted to rank self along with the
others; Ego C is permitted to rank self, but does not establish a weak order,
since sets {A,D} and {B,C} are incomparable; and Ego D reports compar-
isons that violate transitivity. Notice that not all these can be represented
using a rank matrix y?·,·, but all can be represented using the comparison
operation y·: ·· and sample space constraints.
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misleading, in that these ranks are not comparable across egos (rows). If the
ordering is weak (i.e., there are ties), alters may share ranks, as with Ego A
ranking Alters B and C equally in the idiosyncratic network y? in Figure 3.
The diagonal of y·,· is undefined, unless the egos also rank themselves in the
data as Egos B and C do in Figure 3.
Secondly, we may represent the comparisons reported by an ego i, or im-
plied by i’s ranking, in a binary n×n-matrix of pairwise comparisons, which
we denote yi: ··. Figure 1 shows how the reported complete ranking can be
thus encoded: D is ranked over B and C both, therefore the corresponding
elements in the matrix yA:DB = yA:DC = 1, while C is not ranked over
D, so yA:DC = 0. Because A does not rank self, the row and column cor-
responding to A are undefined, and because it is not meaningful to compare
an alter to itself, so is the diagonal. (Notably, if A were allowed to rank self,
A’s row and column would be defined, and if A had then chosen to not rank
self, they would be set to 0.) The collection of reported rankings by all the
egos in N can then then be combined into a binary n× n× n-array.
As we have noted, because the framework itself requires relatively few
assumptions regarding
i, pairwise comparison matrices can encode a wider
variety of ranking structures: for example, in y? in Figure 3, Ego C does not
provide enough information to establish a weak order, while Ego D’s reports
violate transitivity of comparisons. This precludes their representation in the
corresponding rows of y?·,· but not their representation as y
?
C: ·· and y
?
D: ··
2.3 Model Formulation and Specification for ERGMs
for Compete Rankings
Krivitsky (2012) suggests that a sample space of complete rankings of every
actor in a network by every other actor can be represented by a directed
network with no self-loops, whose set of observed relations Y = N26= maps
to dyad values S = {1 .. n− 1}, with the ranked nature of the data leading
to a complex constraint: that an ego i must assign a unique rank to each
possible alter. Formally,
Y = {y′ ∈ SY : ∀i∈N∀r∈S∃!j∈N\{i}y′i,j = r}. (2)
Again, this representation is slightly misleading in that elements of S have
only ordinal and not interval or ratio meanings, and, as we noted above, are
only ordered within the rankings of a given ego. That is, it makes sense to
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ask if for some y ∈ Y and (i, j, k) ∈ N36=, yi,j > yi,k—i.e., whether i ranks
j over k—but not to evaluate the difference between ranks (yi,j − yi,k) or
to compare ranks by different egos (yj,i > yk,i). It does, however, represent
distinct complete rankings in a concise and convenient manner, so we make
use of it, with the proviso that the statistics evaluated on y ∈ Y make use of
no operation other than comparison within an ego’s rankings yi: jk.
Taking the set defined by (2) as our sample space, we can specify an
exponential family for rank-order networks by defining a sufficient statistic
g(y;x), a function of a network y ∈ Y that may also depend on exogenous
covariates x ∈ X (assumed fixed and known), for an exponential family and
parametrized by θ ∈ Rp. The probability associated with each network y in
the sample space is then
Prθ;g,x(Y = y) =
exp{θ · g(y;x)}
κg,x(θ)
, y ∈ Y (3)
with the normalizing factor
κg,x(θ) =
∑
y′∈Y
exp{θ · g(y′;x)}. (4)
This is an exact parallel to the more familiar ERGMs for dichotomous data
(e.g., Wasserman and Pattison 1996). For notational convenience, we will
drop x from now on, unless the term in question uses it explicitly.
3 Terms and Parameters for Ordinal Rela-
tional Data
We now introduce and discuss a variety of sufficient statistics g(·; ·) for the
model of (3) (“model terms”) that abide by the restrictions discussed in
Section 2 while viably representing phenomena frequently observed in social
networks. For each term, we discuss how it may be interpreted, without
assuming rankings to have more than ordinal meaning.
3.1 Interpreting Model Terms Using “Promotion” Statis-
tics
For binary ERGMs, Snijders et al. (2006), Hunter et al. (2008b), and others
have used change statistics or change scores, the effect on the model of a
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toggling of a tie—an atomic change in the binary network structure—to aid
in interpreting the model terms. For complete ordering data, where changing
the ranking of one individual necessarily changes ranking of others, a candi-
date for an analogous atomic change must affect positions of as few actors as
possible. Such a change is the swapping of rankings by two adjacently-ranked
alters by a single ego. We thus use the effect of having ego i “promote” a pro-
motable alter j ∈ {k ∈ N : k 6= i∧ yi,k < n−1}, swapping j’s rank with that
of the alter previously ranked immediately above j, as such a change. When
it is clear from context (as below), we will use “j+” to refer to the promoted-
over alter. (See Butts (2007a) for a related use of pairwise permutations to
assess model terms.)
Let yi: jj
+
represent the network y with i’s ranking of j and j+, the
actor previously ranked by i immediately above j, swapped. We define a
promotion statistic as
∆↗i,jg(y) ≡ g(yi: jj
+
)− g(y),
i.e., the change in g resulting from “promoting” j by one rank (and demoting
the alter above him or her). An example of this is given Figure 2: starting
with a network y (a), Ego A promotes Alter B (who had been ranked im-
mediately below C in y) over C to create yA:BC (b). Its effect on y·,· is to
swap the rank values yA,B and yA,C, and the effect on the pairwise compar-
ison matrix yA: ·· is the smallest possible subject to the complete ordering
constraint: the indicators yA:BC and yA:CB are swapped. In contrast, if
Ego A promotes Alter B over D, who had not been adjacently ranked to B in
y, producing yA:BD (c), the effect on y·,· is similar as before, but the effect
on yA: ·· is profound.
Analogously to change scores, the promotion statistic emerges when con-
sidering the conditional probability of an ego i ranking an alter j over alter
j+, other rankings being the same. To see how, let y be a network that has
i ranking k ≡ j+ immediately over j, so that yi: jk is an otherwise identical
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network where i ranks j over k instead. Then,
Prθ;g(yi: jk = 1|Y = yi: jk ∨ Y = y)
=
Prθ;g{Yi: jk = 1 ∧ (Y = yi: jk ∨ Y = y)}
Prθ;g(Y = yi: jk ∨ Y = y)
=
Prθ;g(Y = y
i: jk)
Prθ;g(Y = yi: jk) + Prθ;g(Y = y)
=
exp{θ · g(yi: jk)}/κg(θ)
exp{θ · g(yi: jk)}/κg(θ) + exp{θ · g(y)}/κg(θ)
=
exp(θ · {g(yi: jk)− g(y)})
exp [θ · {g(yi: jk)− g(y)}] + 1
= logit−1{θ ·∆↗i,jg(y)},
since, by construction, k ≡ j+ in y.
In this, the promotion statistic also reflects the conditional dependence
structure of the model: if its form for a particular g(·; ·) does not depend on a
particular datum, using it in the model cannot induce conditional dependence
on that datum. Thus, although we do not derive our model terms from a
conditional dependence structure (cf. Robins et al. (1999)), we can use them
to examine the conditional dependence structure of the model for each term
we consider.
Note that promotion statistics are mainly useful for complete orderings:
if the ordering is partial, it is possible for i to promote j without demoting
j+. (See Butts (2007b) for a parallel case involving models for one-to-one
versus many-to-one assignments.)
3.2 Terms for Exogenous Covariates
We begin our quorum of substantively useful statistics by considering “ex-
ogenous” factors: those factors that would influence rankings by an ego i
in a manner that is independent (in the probabilistic sense) of the rankings
of all other egos i′ ∈ N\ {i}. (Indeed, none of the promotion statistics in
this section depend on any other rankings.) Substantively, these factors are
exogenous to the ranking process in that they are not, at least on the time
scale of the process, mutable, or in that they operate independently of an
ego i being able to observe or infer rankings or other salient states or actions
(that are endogenous to the model) of any other ego i′.
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3.2.1 Attractiveness/Popularity Effects
For assessments of attractiveness, liking, and status, it is likely that egos’
rankings will be influenced by some relatively stable (and exogenous) tenden-
cies of particular alters to be rated more highly than others. For instance,
assessments of physical attractiveness tend to be broadly consistent within a
given cultural context, and such assessments correlate positively with phys-
ical attributes and performance characteristics (e.g., subtleties of dress and
speech) that are usually difficult to alter over short time scales (Morse et al.
1974; Webster and Driskell 1983). Thus, we have the emic notion that some
persons “are attractive”, with the attribution regarded as a fixed trait of
the person being assessed; while the reality is less trivial, stable factors gov-
erning attractiveness are sufficiently important that we may wish to capture
them where possible. In other settings, institutionalized status characteris-
tics (e.g., group membership, formal social roles) or the like may have similar
effects (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Berger et al. 1977).
Regardless of source, we can treat these effects directly by positing some
covariate vector x ∈ Rn, associated with a statistic of the general form
gA(y;x) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6=
yi: jk(xj − xk).
This statistic simply indexes the tendency for those with higher values on
x to be ranked more highly than those with lower values. The promotion
statistic associated with the above is of the form
∆↗i,jgA(y;x) = 2(xj − xj+),
i.e., twice the difference between the attractiveness of j and the actor over
whom j may be promoted. Thus, the effect of this term on the odds of i
promoting j is exp(2θA(xj − xj+)). As expressed, gA treats x as at least
an interval scale; in other cases, the subtraction operator would need to be
replaced with a more appropriate function. While x may be an observed
covariate, it is worth noting that this quantity is also a natural candidate for
treatment via a random popularity effect (van Duijn, Snijders, and Zijlstra
2004).
Example: As an illustrative example of the above, we consider these statis-
tics in the cases of the sample complete-ordering networks y and yA:BC
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from Figure 2. For purposes of illustration, we also assume that each sample
network is associated with a covariate vector x taking the values (1, 2, 3, 4).
Note that gA is equal to the sum of the signed differences in the elements
of x for all those ordered pairs having non-zero entries in y·: ··. These en-
tries are depicted in Figure 2; summing the associated differences gives us
gA(y;x) = 6 and gA(y
A:BC;x) = 4. Intuitively, the ratings of y are more
strongly aligned with the attribute values in x than those of yA:BC. Note
that the difference between gA(y;x) and gA(y
A:BC;x) is necessarily equal
to the promotion statistic for a swap of B and C in A’s rating structure, i.e.
2(xB − xC) = 2(2 − 3) = −2. In the case of attractiveness, we thus have
the intuitive notion that promoting an actor with a lower attribute value
over one whose attribute value is higher results in a decline in the associated
statistic.
3.2.2 Difference/Similarity Effects
Just as one may posit a differential tendency to “win” ranking contests over-
all, one may also posit that each actor i has exogenous characteristic xi ∈ X
such that alters “close to” or “far from” ego will be more likely to be highly
ranked than those with the reverse attributes. (Such assumptions are the ba-
sis of models such as e.g., spatial voting theory (Enelow and Hinich 1984).)
This is a familiar application of homophily/heterophily to the rank order
case, and the implementation is straightforward:
gH(y;x) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6=
yi: jk [z(xi,xj)− z(xi,xk)] , (5)
where z : X2 → R is any function that is monotone increasing in the difference
between its arguments. Thus, where this statistic is enhanced we expect “far”
actors to outrank “near” ones (from the point of actor i), with the reverse
holding where this statistic is suppressed. The atomic effect of this term is
simply
∆↗i,jgH(y;x) = 2 [z(xi,xj)− z(xi,xj+)] .
As with attractiveness, difference effects can be based either on observed
covariates or on latent quantities.
Example: Returning to our two sample cases, let us consider how gH varies
(again taking x = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and for simplicity taking z equal to the absolute
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difference). In the case of gA, our statistic reduced to the sum of attribute
value differences for ordered pairs having a judgment in y·: ··; the present case
can be recognized as essentially similar, with the only distinction being that
the relevant attribute for yi: jk is now the proximity to the rater (i) vis-a-vis
x. Summing over the ordinal judgments in each case gives us gH(y;x) = 6,
gH(y
A:BC;x) = 4, and ∆↗A,BgH(y) = 2(|xA − xB| − |xA − xC|) = 2(|1− 2| −
|1− 3|) = −2.
3.2.3 Dyadic Covariates
We can extend the above logic to general dyadic covariates. For instance,
we may consider a case in which a within-context ranking is made by ac-
tors having ongoing social relationships; we might expect, then, that actors
engaged in positive long-term relationships would tend to give preference to
their partners within the specific rating context. Statistics for this behavior
can be produced like so:
gDyad(y;x) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6=
yi: jk (xi,j − xi,k)
∆↗i,jgDyad(y;x) = 2 (xi,j − xi,j+) .
Of course, the cases of attractiveness and difference described above are
simply special cases of dyadic covariates, with particular structure imposed.
(Notably, the matrix permutation family (ERGP) of Butts (2007a) has a
somewhat similar structure.) As such, we do not provide numerical examples
here (though see the empirical examples in section 5.2.)
3.2.4 Comparison Covariates
Finally, in the framework of pairwise comparison, the most general exogenous
covariate form assigns a weight to each pairwise comparison by each ego:
gP(y;x) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6=
yi: jkxi,j,k,
for some x ∈ RN3 6=—assigning to each distinct ordered triple (i, j, k) a co-
variate value xi,j,k—resulting in
∆↗i,jgP(y;x) = (xi,j,j+ − xi,j+,j) .
This statistic has all other exogenous statistics as special cases.
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3.3 Terms for Endogenous Mechanisms
We now turn to factors that are endogenous in the sense that, unlike exoge-
nous factors, their effect on the rankings by ego i does depend on rankings
by other egos i′ ∈ N\ {i}. Substantively, these are factors for phenomena
that may plausibly arise in cases for which ego observes or is able to infer
the rankings of others.
3.3.1 Global Conformity
In many settings where an ego is able to observe or infer the rankings of
others, there is reason to presume that this will influence ego, so that he
or she will tend to bring his or her own rankings into conformance with
others’. This is certainly true in dominance or status rankings, where there
is considerable evidence that individuals can and do infer status ordering from
observation of third-party judgments (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 2006); this
synchronization may even be explicit, as in certain types of gossip (wherein
two or more parties “compare notes” on the relative status of their peers)
(Dunbar 1997). The status of influence for relations such as relative liking is
less clear, but still plausible: ego may take alter’s evaluations of the relative
merits of other alters into account in assessing his or her own preferences,
just one can be influenced in one’s judgment of the merits of food, art, or
other experiential goods by the evaluations of others (Bordieu 1968). Finally,
the mutual observability of rankings may produce in some settings a form of
“conformity pressure” (Asch 1951, for example), such that those displaying
deviant rankings anticipate (and are possibly exposed to) sanction. The
importance of influence processes in such settings is well-documented.
To formalize influence in the ranking context, we must note that four
elements are involved: ego’s assessment of two alters (say, j and k), and the
assessment of those same alters by a distinct third party (say, l /∈ {i, j, k}).
Denoting ego by i, we note that ego’s assessment of j and k is in conformity
with l’s assessment of j and k when yi: jk = yl: jk and yi: kj = yl: kj. A
natural statistic to summarize the degree of ratings nonconformity, then, is
gGNC(y) =
∑
(i,j,k,l)∈N4 6=
yl: jk
(
1− yi: jk
)
. (6)
The promotion statistic for nonconformity can be derived by observing that
when i promotes j over j+, the statistic is incremented by 2 every other ego
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l who has j+ ranked over j and decremented by 2 for every l who has j
ranked over j+ (1 for i conforming/disconforming to l and 1 for l conform-
ing/disconforming to i). Thus,
∆↗i,jgGNC(y) = 2
∑
l∈N\{i,j,j+}
(yl: j+j − yl: jj+), (7)
a “vote” among the ls as to the relative ranking of j and j+. Insofar as
influence is active, gGNC should be suppressed (and the associated parameter
negative). In the typical case of total ordering within subjects, sufficiently
strong suppression of gGNC will force the population to converge to a universal
consensus ranking; if the suppression is weaker, a looser but analogous set of
states will be favored.
It should be noted that this form of influence and the random attractive-
ness effect, mentioned in Section 3.2.1, can both explain the same network
feature: both heterogeneity in attractiveness and social influence induce an
agreement in rankings, and the latter may be considered a marginal represen-
tation of the former, in a manner similar to that of a within-group correlation
as a marginal reflection of a (conditional) random effects linear model.
Example: For our sample networks, y and yA:BC, summing over all
tetrads gives us respectively gA(y) = 8 and gA(y
A:BC) = 6. As this implies,
∆↗A,BgGNC(y) = 2
∑
l∈N\{A,B,C}(yl: CB − yl: BC) = 2(yD:CB − yD:BC) =
2(0 − 1) = −2. Intuitively, this implies that the ratings of yA:BC are
in greater consistency with one another than those of y; as the promotion
statistic indicates, this is because A’s switching from C A B to B A C brings
A view of B and C into conformity with the view of D. To the extent that
greater conformity pressure is present (i.e., a negative coefficient associated
with gA, such changes are (ceteris paribus) favored.
3.3.2 Local Conformity
For global nonconformity gGNC, the promotion statistic (7) implies that i
weights agreement with every other l equally, regardless of how i had ranked
l. In some cases, it may be plausible that the salience of l for i may depend
upon i’s ranking of him or her; for instance, i may be more likely to attend
to (and to conform to) those whom he or she ranks highly than those whom
he or she ranks lower. A possible formalization of this is the notion that i’s
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ranking of j would be influenced by l only if i ranks l over j, so only actors
ranked above j influence i’s rankings involving j. As with global conformity,
we define this statistic, the local nonconformity, negatively: counting the
number of instances where an ego had ranked l over two alters j and k but
then did not conform to l’s ranking of j relative to k:
gLNC(y) =
∑
(i,j,k,l)∈N46=
yi: ljyi: lkyl: jk(1− yi: jk). (8)
The atomic effects for this statistic are somewhat complex:
∆↗i,jgLNC(y) =
∑
k∈N\{i,j,j+}
(yi: kj+yk: j+j − yi: kj+yk: jj+ (9a)
+ yk: ij+yk: j+j − yk: ijyk: jj+ (9b)
+ yj: kj+yi: j+k − yj+: kjyi: jk). (9c)
They have, however, a meaningful interpretation. The two terms (9a) repre-
sent the effect of i bringing his or her ordering of j and j+ into conformance
(or disconformance) with those of some actor k whom i had ranked higher
than at least one of them. The pair (9b) represents the situation where
some actor k ranks i over j and/or j+, so i promoting j over j+ either cre-
ates or eliminates disconformance on the part of k. The pair (9c) represent
the notion that nonconformity is also created if actors i and j disagree on
the ordering of j+ and some actor k, so i promoting j over j+ creates dis-
conformance by making j’s ordering of j+ salient to i. (Ego i can resolve
this tension either by changing the ranking of j+ and k to conform with j
(affecting (9a)) or by demoting j to make his or her ranking less salient.)
Example: For our sample networks y and yA:BC, calculation of the lo-
cal conformity statistic shows that y exhibits a slightly higher level of non-
conformity than yA:BC: gLNC(y) = 2, versus gLNC(y
A:BC) = 1. To appre-
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ciate the origin of this difference we may examine the promotion statistic:
∆↗A,BgLNC(y) = (yA:DCyD:CB − yA:DCyD:BC
+ yD:ACyD:CB − yD:AByD:BC
+ yA:CDyB:DC − yA:BDyC:BD)
= (1× 0− 1× 1
+ 0× 0− 0× 1
+ 0× 1− 0× 1) = −1.
In promoting B over C, A conformed with D—the only actor A ranked over
both B and C—so local nonconformity declined (per Equation (9a)). D did
not rank A highly enough to experience conformity pressure in ranking B
and C, and the only actor who ranked A highly is C, but since actors are not
permitted to rank themselves, C has nothing to say about C’s own ranking
relative to B (see Equation (9b)). Promoting C over B made B salient in
comparisons about C, but not about D, so no disconformance was created or
eliminated in this respect (see Equation (9c)). As this case illustrates, local
nonconformity involves both consistency of ratings and status: to the extent
that pressure for local conformity is present, actors will seek to adapt their
rankings to match those of individuals they rate highly, with less regard to
mismatches with those to whom they assign a low rank.
3.3.3 Deference Aversion
Influence, as defined above, deals with the mutual adjustment among raters
regarding their relative assessments of third parties. When ego is a party
to the rating in question, the situation becomes more complex. By assump-
tion, ego does not explicitly self-rate; thus, ego cannot adjust towards alter’s
impression of him or her. In many settings, however, another mechanism
may be active that will make alter’s ranking of ego salient for ego’s rank-
ing of alter. In particular, consider the case in which higher rankings are
associated with positive evaluation, such that being ranked below others is
aversive. Moreover, let us assume that ego infers his or her own status via
an implicit transitivity mechanism, such that if alter l ranks j above ego (i)
and ego ranks l above j, then ego is for social purposes ranking himself or
herself below l. Under such circumstances, deference aversion may lead ego
to resist ranking l above j.
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To capture this notion with a statistic, we propose the following:
gD(y) =
∑
(i,j,l)∈N3 6=
yl: jiyi: lj. (10)
We expect this statistic to be suppressed where deference aversion is present.
The promotion statistic is incremented if j+ had ranked i over j, since it
creates a deference of j+ to i via j; or if j had ranked j+ over i since it
creates a deference of i to j via k; and it is decremented if j+ had ranked j
over i, as it would eliminate the deference of i to j+ via j; or if j had ranked
i over j+, as it would eliminate the deference of j to i via j+. Thus,
∆↗i,jgD(y) = 2(yj+: ij + yj: j+i − 1).
It is interesting to note that the principal effect of suppressing this statistic
is actually to bring ego’s rankings in line with those of alter, somewhat akin
to the reciprocity or mutuality in binary relations. Specifically, if there are r
persons ranked by alter as being above ego, then ego will also tend to rank
those same r persons as being above alter. Where a total order is present,
ego and alter will thus tend to give each other the same rank (and, indeed,
to agree on those persons having higher ranks). Of course, applying this
logic to all pairs suggests pressure towards equality, which is impossible to
achieve in the total order case (but not necessarily for others). Even in the
case of total orders, however, considerable variation in gD is possible, with
lower values indicating rating structures in which agreement between raters
on high-ranked alters is maximized.
Example: While we saw that yA:BC showed lower local nonconformity
than y, we see the opposite for deference aversion: applying the above defi-
nition to the two networks gives us gD(y) = 6 and gD(y
A:BC) = 8, implying
that y has fewer instances in which an individual tacitly places him or herself
below others in the network. Examining the promotion statistic, we see that
∆↗A,BgD(y) = 2(yC:AB + yB:CA − 1)
= 2× (1 + 1− 1) = 2.
Intuitively, C had ranked A over B, so in ranking C over B, A was not defer-
ring to either party. By contrast, B had ranked C over A, so in promoting B
over C, A implicitly deferred to B. In settings for which deference aversion
is operative, such changes are ceteris paribus unfavorable.
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3.4 Consistency Across Settings
When ranking the same alters among multiple settings—across time or across
rubrics—there is reason to expect that ego will tend to exhibit consistency
in alter ratings. Across time, this is an exogenous effect, because earlier
rankings cannot be influenced by later rankings. Across rubrics, it may be
endogenous. Here, we assume two rating structures, y and y′, on vertex sets
N and N ′, such that some set Ns = N ∩ N ′ of actors are involved in both
networks. For convenience in notation, we take the labeling of the members
of Ns to be the same in both N and N
′. Given this, our statistic measuring
inconsistency is simply
gI(y;y
′) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6=s
[
yi: jk(1− y′i: jk) +
(
1− yi: jk
)
y′
i: jk
]
, (11)
with promotion statistic being simply
∆↗i,jgI(y;y
′) = 2(y′
i: j+j − y′i: jj+).
As gI measures the discordant pairs of rankings in y versus y
′, suppressing
it implies higher levels of cross-context consistency.
The statistic (11) treats all disagreements between y and y′ as equivalent.
It may be the case, however, that only some disagreements are of interest, or
disagreements themselves need to be modeled. This can be facilitated by a
more general form of gI. Given weights x ∈ RN3 6= , (symmetric for complete
orderings, such that xi,j,k ≡ xi,k,j), let the weighted inconsistency of y versus
y′ be defined as
gI(y;y
′,x) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6=s
[
yi: jk(1− y′i: jk) +
(
1− yi: jk
)
y′
i: jk
]
xi,j,k. (12)
Note that x can, itself, be parametrized to model factors affecting disagree-
ment between two rankings, making it a potentially interesting basis for
hierarchical modeling.
These statistics are utilized extensively in the example of Section 5.2,
where they are employed to examine the accuracy of informants’ self-reported
interaction frequencies.
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4 Inference and Implementation
The proposed class of models is a finite exponential family over a finite sample
space. Its natural parameter space ΘN = {θ′ : κg(θ′) < ∞} = Rp, an
open set, so the models from this family are regular and posses all of the
inferential properties of such families (Brown 1986:1–2). Here, we briefly
discuss practical issues associated with fitting the models of this class.
4.1 Implementation
The sample space of a complete ranking ERGM is finite but large (|Y| =
{(n− 1)!}n), so even for networks of modest size, evaluating the normalizing
constant (4) is not computationally feasible. However, provided a method for
sampling from this ERGM distribution Prθ;g(·) exists, the Monte Carlo MLE
method can be used to fit the model. (Geyer and Thompson 1992; Hunter
and Handcock 2006; Krivitsky 2012) We review this technique and describe a
simple algorithm for sampling from an ERGM for complete ordering defined
in Section 2 in the Appendix. Bayesian inference using exchange algorithms
is also possible, if more computationally expensive. (Caimo and Friel 2011)
We base our implementation on the valued ERGM extensions of Krivitsky
(2012) to the R (R Core Team 2014) package ergm (Hunter et al. 2008b;
Handcock et al. 2014). We expect to publicly release our extensions in a new
package, ergm.rank.
Lacking a general procedure such as the maximum pseudo-likelihood es-
timation (MPLE) (Strauss and Ikeda 1990) to use as a starting point for
optimization, we initiated the MCMC MLE optimization at θ = 0 in each
of our applications. This parameter configuration corresponds to a uniform
distribution on the space of possible rankings, and it is therefore the safest
configuration to start with. Although a poor starting value can cause MCMC
MLE to fail, techniques such as the Stepping Algorithm of (Hummel, Hunter,
and Handcock 2012) can be used to ameliorate its effects, and a form of it is
used here as well.
4.2 Degeneracy
Degeneracy, in its many meanings, is often a concern in applying ERGMs.
Despite recent progress (Rinaldo, Fienberg, and Zhou 2009; Butts 2011;
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Schweinberger 2011, for example), few general and unambiguous diagnos-
tics for degeneracy exist beyond simulated goodness-of-fit measures (Hunter,
Goodreau, and Handcock 2008a) and diagnostics of symptoms such as poor
convergence of the MLE-finding procedure and, in particular, poor mixing
of the MCMC MLE algorithm (Goodreau, Handcock, Hunter, Butts, and
Morris 2008a), often due to multimodality of the distribution of networks
under the model (Snijders et al. 2006; Rinaldo et al. 2009; Krivitsky 2012).
In our case, there is some cause for concern due to the high order of some
of the sufficient statistics we propose. For example, gGNC is a summation of
indicators over a set of cardinality
∣∣N46=∣∣ = O(n4). Its promotion statistic
∆↗i,jgGNC is a sum over a set of O(n). Thus, there may exist configurations
for which a small change in the ranking leads to a massive change in the
value of this statistic and thus in the likelihood. Such statistics can induce
excessively strong dependence in many cases lead to asymptotic degeneracy
(Butts 2011; Schweinberger 2011).
At the same time, a number of factors are likely to ameliorate such prob-
lems for the specific case of rank data. A network of ranks simply contains
more information than a network of binary outcomes of the same size. More
concretely, a uniform distribution over binary directed networks of size n with
no self-loops has entropy of n(n− 1) bits, while a uniform distribution over
rank networks has entropy of log2{(n− 1)!}n = n log2{(n− 1)!} bits, which
grows much faster in n. This can reduce the risk of pathological model be-
havior due to poor identification in the small-n case. Also, while there exists
the potential for problematic statistics and configurations, the constrained
nature of the sample space makes degeneracy more difficult to achieve than
is the case for typical graphs or digraphs: an ego cannot promote one al-
ter without demoting another, and while some statistics, like gGNC, have an
extreme case of all actors agreeing, others, like gD, cannot be reduced to 0.
In all of the following examples, we found no symptoms of degeneracy: all
estimators converged without issues to estimates for which the expectations
of sufficient statistics from the penultimate MCMC MLE step were close to
their observed values, and MCMC diagnostics showed no sign of poor mixing
or multimodality, and MCMC sample sizes used were sufficient to render the
error due to the use of MCMC to approximate the likelihood (Hunter and
Handcock 2006: eq. 3.11) negligible compared to the standard error. That
these MLEs were found and converged to despite the 0 starting point, again,
suggests that models using the terms introduced here are quite robust. In
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practice, we recommend simulation from fitted models (as in the case of
binary ERGMs) as a useful tool for verifying non-degeneracy.
5 Examples
5.1 Dynamics of the Acquaintance Process
From 1953 to 1956, a research group led by Theodore Newcomb (1961) con-
ducted an experimental study of acquaintance and friendship formation. In
each of the two study years, 17 men attending the University of Michigan—
all transfer students with no prior acquaintance among them—were recruited
to live in off-campus fraternity-style housing. Demographic, attitudinal, and
sociometric information was collected about the subjects. In particular, in
the second year, at each of 15 weekly time points (with week 9 being missing),
each participant was asked to rate all other participants on “favorableness of
feeling”, with ratings forced to be distinct and converted to ranks. (1961:32–
34) These data represent an example of longitudinal data of complete ranks,
and, particularly the data from the second year of the study, have been used
to study the formation of interpersonal relationships by Newcomb (1956),
Breiger et al. (1975), White et al. (1976), Arabie et al. (1978), Wasserman
(1980), Pattison (1982), Nakao and Romney (1993), Doreian et al. (1996),
Krackhardt and Handcock (2007), and many others.
We use ERGMs for rank-order data to study this network, examining the
social forces relevant to its structure and its evolution over time. We take
two distinct approaches: cross-sectional, where each time point’s network
structure is modeled on its own and dynamic, where each time point but
the first is effectively modeled as a change from the previous time point’s
rankings.
5.1.1 Cross-sectional Analysis
Demographic data, including age, religion, and political views of the sub-
jects were gathered. Also, within the house, the subjects were assigned to
rooms, spread over two floors of the house—three one-occupant rooms, four
two-occupant, and two three-occupant rooms (Newcomb 1961:67–68). Fur-
thermore, while some were assigned to rooms at random, others were assigned
with an aim to maximize (for some rooms) and minimize (for other rooms)
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Figure 4: Estimated coefficients for the cross-sectional model fit to each
week’s rankings in the Newcomb’s Fraternity. Error bars are at 95% confi-
dence.
the roommates’ compatibility as understood by the researchers (1961:216–
220). If available, all of these factors could be used as predictors in our
modeling framework via terms introduced in Section 3.2. Sadly, however,
none of these elements of the Newcomb data survive, leaving us to focus on
endogenous effects (although the “birds of a feather or friend of a friend”
(Goodreau et al. 2008b) caveat applies). For each of the 15 networks, we
model deference aversion (via gD(Y
t) (10)) and global (via gGNC(Y
t) (6))
and local (via gLNC(Y
t) (8)) conformity. Per Section 3.3.1, the suppress-
ing of the global nonconformity statistic produces the same effect as latent
actor attractiveness, so it may, in this case, be viewed as modeling latent
heterogeneity in popularity.
We report the maximum likelihood estimates for each of the terms over
time in Table 1 and plot them in Figure 4. Deference aversion is significant
(the coefficient on the deference statistic is negative) throughout the evolu-
tion of rankings, starting with the first point of observation. This is consistent
with the finding of Newcomb (1956), Doreian et al. (1996), and others that
“friendships are reciprocated immediately”. Our analysis, however, suggests
deepening deference aversion over time, not reaching its ultimate magnitude
until week 4 or 7. (Informally, the estimated Kendall’s rank correlation be-
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Table 1: Results for cross-sectional analysis of the Newcomb’s data
Estimates (Std. Errors)
Nonconformity
Week Deference Global Local
0 −0.153 (0.039)??? −0.004 (0.003) −0.010 (0.010)
1 −0.218 (0.047)??? −0.001 (0.003) −0.020 (0.009)?
2 −0.221 (0.047)??? 0.002 (0.003) −0.031 (0.009)???
3 −0.209 (0.046)??? 0.004 (0.003) −0.036 (0.008)???
4 −0.288 (0.060)??? 0.001 (0.003) −0.034 (0.008)???
5 −0.251 (0.058)??? 0.001 (0.003) −0.040 (0.008)???
6 −0.236 (0.057)??? 0.000 (0.003) −0.037 (0.008)???
7 −0.399 (0.081)??? 0.003 (0.002) −0.045 (0.007)???
8 −0.373 (0.073)??? 0.001 (0.003) −0.037 (0.007)???
10 −0.312 (0.070)??? 0.003 (0.003) −0.046 (0.007)???
11 −0.254 (0.060)??? 0.003 (0.003) −0.045 (0.008)???
12 −0.299 (0.066)??? −0.000 (0.003) −0.036 (0.007)???
13 −0.174 (0.050)??? 0.002 (0.003) −0.047 (0.008)???
14 −0.365 (0.078)??? 0.002 (0.003) −0.045 (0.009)???
15 −0.337 (0.076)??? 0.001 (0.003) −0.042 (0.008)???
Significance levels: 0.05 ≥?> 0.01 ≥??> 0.001 ≥???
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tween the parameter estimate and week number is τˆ = −0.41, significant
with P -value = 0.036.) One explanation for this difference is that prior
analyses, including that of Doreian et al. (1996), dichotomized the dyads in
the network. Our approach uses the entire ranking and may thus be more
precise.
The local nonconformity term is also significant for all but the first obser-
vation point, although its effects seem to emerge more gradually than those
of deference aversion (Kendall’s τˆ = −0.64, P -value < 0.001), leveling off
around Week 7 or perhaps even later. This does agree with Doreian et al.
(1996), although others have suggested earlier and later times when the net-
work stabilized.
In the presence of the local nonconformity term, the global nonconfor-
mity term is not significant: there does not appear to be a significant overall
consensus in ratings, although Newcomb (1956) reports that three specific
subjects were generally disliked by everyone, including each other, so perhaps
failing to detect this is a result of lack of power and presence of the local non-
conformity term. Notably, the estimated correlation between the local and
global nonconformity parameters (within each week’s fit) is strongly nega-
tive and consistent (−0.87–−0.77). This suggests that these terms explain
similar behavior, though, significance of one and not the other indicates that
conformity is primarily to those more liked.
5.1.2 Dynamic Analysis
We now turn to modeling the evolution of the rankings over time. For our
dynamic analysis, we use a simple Markov formulation similar to those of
Krackhardt and Handcock (2007) and Hanneke, Fu, and Xing (2010) for the
evolution of rankings over time:
Prθ;g(Y
t = yt|Y t−1 = yt−1) = exp{θ · g(y
t;yt−1)}
κg(θ,yt−1)
,
having the normalizing constant
κg(θ,y
t−1) =
∑
y′∈Y
exp{θ · g(y′;yt−1)}.
For each of the 14 transitions between successive networks, in addition to
the three terms used in the cross-sectional analysis, we model inconsistency
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Figure 5: Estimated coefficients for the longitudinal model fit to each week’s
rankings in the Newcomb’s Fraternity. Error bars are at 95% confidence.
over time via gI(Y
t;Y t−1) (11). This term effectively absorbs the structure
in the network at t that is due to inertia and to social forces operating in the
time periods prior to t− 1, and thus the other terms model the social forces
affecting only the changes in the rankings over time.
Because we seek to examine the strengths of the factors over time, we
use time-varying parameters (although Krivitsky and Handcock (2014) show
that the approach of Hunter and Handcock (2006) can be applied to series of
networks or transitions as well). Week 9 rankings were not reported. Because
of this, for Week 10, we fit the parameters for transition from Week 8.
The maximum likelihood estimates for each transition are reported in
Table 2 and visualized in Figure 5. The estimates for the transition from
Week 8 to Week 10 do not appear to be qualitatively different from those
from nearby transitions. In particular, inconsistency does not appear to be
higher over this particular two-week period.
The clear downward trend (τˆ = −0.54, P -value = 0.007) in inconsistency
over successive weeks suggests that the rankings are initially in flux as the
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Table 2: Results for dynamic analysis of the Newcomb’s data
Estimates (Std. Errors)
Week Inconsistency Nonconformity
Transition with Prior Week Deference Global Local
0→ 1 −0.135 (0.015)??? −0.192 (0.048)??? 0.001 (0.003) −0.019 (0.009)?
1→ 2 −0.212 (0.020)??? −0.165 (0.051)?? 0.005 (0.004) −0.032 (0.010)??
2→ 3 −0.244 (0.021)??? −0.130 (0.055)? 0.002 (0.004) −0.030 (0.011)??
3→ 4 −0.281 (0.026)??? −0.206 (0.071)?? −0.007 (0.004) −0.026 (0.010)??
4→ 5 −0.292 (0.026)??? −0.128 (0.068) −0.005 (0.004) −0.029 (0.010)??
5→ 6 −0.348 (0.027)??? −0.133 (0.071) −0.003 (0.005) −0.016 (0.011)
6→ 7 −0.389 (0.030)??? −0.392 (0.091)??? 0.008 (0.006) −0.046 (0.011)???
7→ 8 −0.309 (0.028)??? −0.218 (0.083)?? −0.002 (0.005) −0.013 (0.011)
8→ 10 −0.301 (0.026)??? −0.157 (0.077)? −0.000 (0.005) −0.034 (0.011)??
10→ 11 −0.289 (0.025)??? −0.126 (0.070) −0.001 (0.004) −0.024 (0.010)?
11→ 12 −0.324 (0.027)??? −0.216 (0.078)?? −0.006 (0.005) −0.009 (0.011)
12→ 13 −0.373 (0.032)??? −0.017 (0.066) 0.006 (0.006) −0.042 (0.012)???
13→ 14 −0.345 (0.029)??? −0.343 (0.090)??? −0.003 (0.005) −0.031 (0.010)??
14→ 15 −0.314 (0.027)??? −0.190 (0.085)? −0.004 (0.004) −0.025 (0.011)?
Significance levels: 0.05 ≥?> 0.01 ≥??> 0.001 ≥???
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acquaintance process takes place, solidifying over time. As before, global
nonconformity is not a significant factor. The parameter estimates for the
other two factors still appear to be, on the whole, significant, but are uni-
formly smaller in magnitude compared to those of the corresponding weeks
in the cross-sectional analysis and are less precisely estimated (as represented
by uniformly greater standard errors). This is because rather than embody-
ing the structure of the whole network, they embody only the structure of
changes in the network over the week, and information to infer their strength
is drawn only from those changes. This means that some “instant” social ef-
fects such as friendship reciprocation have been absorbed into the Week 0
observation, which is not modeled in the dynamic analysis.
In contrast to the cross-sectional analysis, neither deference nor local
nonconformity appear to have a significant monotone trend over time (both
correlations have P -value ≥ 0.5). That is, while they are time-varying when
viewed cross-sectionally, the effects of these social forces over and above in-
ertia are fairly consistent over time, at least after the initial time point. This
suggests that this modeling approach may be successfully isolating social
forces as they affect actors’ behavior over time from the effects of preexisting
configurations.
5.2 Informant Accuracy
In the late 1970s, Bernard et al. (1984) conducted a series of studies to as-
sess the accuracy of retrospective sociometric surveys of several types. In
each study, respondents in a social network—deaf teletype users; amateur
radio operators; office workers at a firm; students in a fraternity; and fac-
ulty, graduate students, and staff in an academic program—had their social
interactions observed or recorded and were asked, in retrospect, to indicate
others in their network with whom they interacted, allowing recalled and ob-
served network structures to be compared. In the latter study—conducted in
a graduate program in technology education at West Virginia University—
the 34 subjects had the frequency of their interactions recorded by a team
of observers over the course of a week, and then each subject was asked to
provide a complete ranking of the other subjects on “most to least communi-
cation that week” (Bernard and Killworth 1977). This produces a complete
ranking, suitable for analysis using our methods.
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5.2.1 Modeling inconsistency
In this application, we use models with sufficient statistics of the form (11)
and (12) to assess factors that appear to affect accuracy of rankings. Let
y ∈ Y be the reported rankings; and let yct. ∈ NY0 be a weighted symmetric
graph of the observed frequencies of interaction, so that yct.i,j is the number of
times i and j were observed interacting. Like yt−1 in the previous example,
it is exogenous in our framework.
For notational convenience, we reexpress (3) and (12) as
Prθ;g,x(Y = y|Y ct. = yct.) =
exp
[∑
(i,j,k)∈N3 6={yi: jk(1− yct.i: jk) + (1− yi: jk)yct.i: jk}wi,j,k(θ;x)
]
κg,x(θ)
, (13a)
where
wi,j,k(θ;x) = θ · xi,j,k, (13b)
for covariate n×n×n×p-array x ∈ RN3 6=×{1 .. p}, so that xi,j,k is the p-vector
of covariates associated with i’s comparison of j and k, and, as before, xi,j,k ≡
xi,k,j. This allows us to model inconsistency in a form semblant of logistic
regression. Unlike logistic regression for accuracy of pairwise comparisons,
this model takes into account the dependence between the comparisons that
is induced by the structure of the sample space. (I.e., that yi: jk∧yi: kl =⇒
yi: jl.)
Because there are “ties” among the observed interaction frequencies (i.e.,
where yct.i,j = y
ct.
i,k, so i interacted with j and k equally often), while the
reported rankings are forced to be complete (no ties were allowed), there
is no configuration of rankings y ∈ Y , such that statistic (11) is 0—that
the reported rankings are completely consistent with those observed. This
reveals an interesting property of the proposed class of models: because the
comparisons that are tied in the observed frequencies simply add a constant
to their sufficient statistic, their effect on the likelihood is canceled by the
normalizing constant. That is, inconsistent comparisons only affect the model
and the estimation if it is possible for them to be consistent is in the sample
space.
For convenience, further let yobs.i,j be the observed rank of j among those
with whom i had interacted, with 33 being code for the highest frequency, 1
being code for the lowest frequency, and ranks for tied alters (i.e., yct.i,j = y
ct.
i,k,
for k 6= j) being computed by averaging the ranks that these alters share.
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Table 3: Effect of frequency of interaction on reporting inaccuracy
Estimates (Std. Errors)
Term Frequency Rank
Intercept −0.066 (0.020)?? −0.159 (0.023)???
Frequency difference −0.018 (0.003)???
Frequency rank difference −0.003 (0.003)
Significance levels: 0.05 ≥?> 0.01 ≥??> 0.001 ≥???
5.2.2 Effect of Frequency of Interaction
The first question we address is whether the magnitude of the difference in
the frequency of interaction affects the accuracy. That is, if i’s frequency of
interaction with j differs from i’s frequency of interactions with k by more
than i’s frequency of interaction with j differs from i’s frequency of interaction
with l, is i more likely to rank j and k accurately than j and l?
To answer this, we begin by fitting a simple model with two covari-
ates: xi,j,k,1 = 1 in the form (13), equivalent to plain inconsistency (11);
and xi,j,k,2 =
∣∣yct.i,j − yct.i,k∣∣, the absolute difference between the interaction fre-
quency of i with j and k. We report the results in Table 3. Greater difference
in interaction frequency of two alters does appear to lead to greater accuracy
(i.e., lower inaccuracy) in reporting their relative ranks.
We also fit a similar model where we replace frequency difference with
frequency rank difference: xi,j,k,2 =
∣∣yobs.i,j − yobs.i,k ∣∣. We find that the effect
of rank difference is, as expected, negative, but not statistically significantly
so. This lack of significance may be counterintuitive, but it is, in fact, a
consequence of the constraints imposed by the sample space. Intuitively,
given that i ranks j and k adjacently, an inaccurate reporting of the pairwise
comparison of these alters (e.g., yct.
i: jk but yi: kj) does not entail misreporting
any other pairwise comparisons, including those involving j or k; but if j
and k are some d > 1 ranks apart in yct.—they have d − 1 other alters
between them—then inaccurately reporting the pairwise comparison of j
and k entails inaccurately reporting the pairwise comparisons yct.
i: jl and/or
yct.
i: kl for every l ranked between j and k. It can be shown easily that any
configuration y in which yi: kj 6= yct.i: jk must also misreport at least d − 1
such comparisons. Thus, even a model with no rank difference effect and
only a baseline inconsistency effect would already heavily penalize inaccurate
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reporting of comparisons between distantly-ranked alters.
5.2.3 Effect of Salience
The second question that we address is whether the accuracy of reported
ranking is affected by the positions of those being ranked. Can an ego i
better discern the ranking of those with whom he or she interacts the most?
Is he or she more accurate at the extremes?
To answer this, we fit a model for inconsistency that is a quadratic poly-
nomial in rank values. More concretely, in the form (13), wi,j,k(θ;x) has the
covariate vector
xi,j,k =
[
1, yobs.i,j + y
obs.
i,k , (y
obs.
i,j )
2 + (yobs.i,k )
2, yobs.i,j y
obs.
i,k
]
, (14)
inducing a model in which the inconsistency of reported with observed is
modeled as a second-degree polynomial function of the observed ranks of the
alters being compared; and this function is symmetric for these two alters.
The statistics in (14) represent baseline inconsistency, linear effect of ranks of
the alters being compared, their quadratic effect, and their interaction effect,
respectively.
In fitting this model, we found that it suffers from collinearity, which
impedes inference, so to improve its numeric conditioning, we fit an equivalent
model, using rescaled and centered quantiles, evaluating yq.i,j ≡ (yobs.i,j −17)/32
and substituting yq. for yobs. in (14).
We report results from this fit in Table 4. All four covariates appear to be
highly significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the higher-ranked alters appear to
have slightly higher inconsistency between observed and reported. However,
the negative coefficient on the quadratic term suggests that the middle ranks
are reported with the least accuracy of all. We show the predicted incon-
sistency weight wi,j,k(θˆ;x) as a function of their observed ranks in Figure 6.
From this, it appears that, indeed, for alters whose observed rankings are
close together, the accuracy is lowest if the alters are ranked in the middle.
(For alters whose observed rankings are far apart, the accuracy is higher.)
6 Discussion
As befits the long history of ordinal data analysis in the social sciences, many
extensions and applications of the present framework are possible. Here, we
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Table 4: Effects of alter positions on reporting inaccuracy
Term Estimate (Std. Err.)
Intercept −0.068 (0.024)??
Linear 0.107 (0.018)???
Quadratic −1.300 (0.296)???
Interaction 1.765 (0.512)???
Sig.: 0.05 ≥?> 0.01 ≥??> 0.001 ≥???
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Figure 6: Predicted effect of alter positions on reporting inaccuracy
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briefly discuss two such directions: the extension of the current framework
to “bipartite” rank data; and the use of our framework in settings that im-
ply particular kinds of ordinal constraints (e.g., partial orders, semi-orders,
incompletely observed total orders, etc.).
6.1 Extension to “Bipartite” Rank Data
Although our focus here has been on the classic sociometric setting in which
a group of individuals are asked to rank each other with respect to some di-
mension (e.g., liking), our modeling framework can easily accommodate other
cases as well. One such setting is the case of “bipartite” rank data, in which
members of a given group are asked to rank a set of objects not including
the group members themselves. Examples of such data include preference
rankings of political candidates, organizations, or policy positions; ordinal
judgments regarding physical objects or perceptual stimuli; liking or other
rankings of non-group members, etc. Although such data is widely analyzed
throughout the social sciences using traditional techniques, the contribution
of our approach is the ability to model interdependence among raters in a
natural way. For instance, the global conformity statistic of Section 3.3.1
can be used to capture a general tendency of group members to converge
on a common rating of a set of objects; likewise, the consistency effects of
Section 3.4 have the same meaning in the “bipartite” setting as in a standard
sociometric setting. The exogenous effects of Section 3.2.1 can be used to
capture differences in the net attractiveness of objects to members of the
rating group, and dyadic covariates (Section 3.2.3) can be used to measure
effects related to the tendency of particular raters or subgroups of raters to
give higher/lower ratings to particular objects. On the other hand, statistics
that depend upon the ratings by the object (e.g., local conformity) are clearly
meaningless in a bipartite context, and should not be employed.
The bipartite case suggests certain statistics that may prove especially
useful for assessing influence in structured groups. For instance, consider the
case in which our set of raters, Ne, interact via a known, fixed social network
with adjacency matrix x. Let Na be the set of objects to be ranked. We
may then capture the tendency for those adjacent in x to rate objects in Na
(dis)similarly via the dyadic nonconformity statistic,
gDNC(y) =
∑
(i,l)∈N2 6=e
xi,l
∑
(j,k)∈N2 6=a
yl: jk
(
1− yi: jk
)
.
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To the extent that adjacent actors influence each other to form similar views
of the object set, gDNC will be suppressed; the associated parameter is hence
analogous (up to a sign change) to the autocorrelation parameter in a stan-
dard linear network autocorrelation model (LNAM) (Cliff and Ord 1973;
Doreian 1990). As with the LNAM, the adjacency structure (analogous to
the weight matrix) need not be dichotomous, and can contain continuous
measures of exposure, proximity, similarity, group co-membership, or the
like. Also like the LNAM, the adjacency/weight matrix is taken to be exoge-
nous and fixed; models in which object ratings and interpersonal relationships
co-evolve would be an promising direction for future research in this area.
Simulation and estimation for bipartite rank data requires modifying the
support of the associated model to include only the observable ranks, and
eliminating impermissible rating triads from the proposals in Algorithm 1 in
the Appendix. These are straightforward changes to the base implementa-
tion, and are not discussed in detail here.
6.2 Considerations Relating to Types of Orderings
It should be noted that, in our development, we focus on the case of orderings
that are defined from the psychological process in question, rather than data
that are ordinal simply due to limitations in measurement (e.g., count or
continuous data observed only as ranks). Although the present framework
may in some cases be useful for such data (e.g., to avoid having to model the
count distribution), the assumptions involved, e.g., in the choice of sufficient
statistics (and their interpretation), may be quite different.
This work has focused on complete orderings, but the above distinction
gains further importance when considering partial orderings: the case of
partial orderings being a property of underlying psychological phenomena
is substantively different from the case of incomplete orderings arising from
measurement itself. A well-known example of the latter is a frequently used
sociometric survey design that asks each ego to rank their top k alters with
respect to some criterion (liking, interaction frequency, etc.).
The Sampson (1968) study is instructive in this. Recall that Sampson
asked each of 18 novitiates in a monastery to rank his three most liked
novitiates among the other 17. That only the top three were ranked does
not mean that the underlying ordering is partial and that the remaining 14
alters are tied. Rather, their ranking relative to each other is unobserved by
design: we know that their underlying rank must be below the top three,
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and little else: they may or may not be substantively tied.
Similarly, in 1995–1996, the Wave I of National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health, mentioned in the Introduction, asked high school students
to list, in order, up to 5 male and up to 5 female friends. (Harris et al. 2003)
Again, the students unranked (either because they fell below the respondent’s
threshold for friendship or because the respondent ran out of space on the
form) are not all necessarily substantively tied (i.e., assigned the same rank)
but are merely unobserved. In addition, because male and female students
were ranked separately, there is no information about underlying ranking of
each respondent’s female friends relative to his or her male friends, creating
a situation with incomparable subsets, analogous to that of Ego C in the
toy network y?. (Notably, such data would still permit one to infer, at least
for those who did not nominate their maximum of 5, that anyone (of either
sex) whom they had chosen not to rank has an underlying rank lower than
anyone (of either sex) whom they had chosen to rank.)
Cases of unobserved ranking are better handled by means of a latent vari-
able framework in which a probability distribution is placed on the complete
data, and in which likelihood is assessed via the marginalization of the com-
plete data conditional on that observed. (Plackett–Luce models for top-k
ranking data (Plackett 1975) do this implicitly.) Such a strategy has been
used in the traditional ERGM framework by Handcock and Gile (2010), and
can be employed here as well.
In contrast, orderings in which the alters may be substantively tied or
incomparable with each other—partial orderings—pose different challenges.
In contrast to the above, a close examination of Sampson’s data reveals that
some of the novitiates were, in fact, recorded assigning equal ranks to some of
those they nominated; and these would be substantively tied in an underlying
partial ordering. Tied ratings in data like that of Johnson et al. (2003) could
be interpreted either way: either that the scale of 0–10 was not sufficiently
granular to encode small differences in degrees of interaction, so which of the
tied alters was actually higher is unobserved; or that an ego’s choice to rate
two alters equally means that their degrees of interaction were substantively
the same.
In the complete ordering case, there exists a distribution of rank-orderings
that is unambiguously uniform and can thus serve as the baseline distribution
(reference measure) for the exponential family (see, e.g. Barndorff-Nielsen
1978:115–116). In the partially ordered case, there is no natural baseline
that is unambiguously uniform. For example, an ego may rank all n − 1
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alters equally (with only one such “ranking” possible) or he or she may
assign a distinct rank to each (with (n− 1)! possible rankings), or anything
in between. Modeling of partial orderings, therefore, requires modeling not
only the actors’ ranking propensities but also their choices whether to rank
or not to rank, and, in particular, the baseline distribution of these choices,
when θ = 0. How to capture such behavior in a cognitively realistic way is
not currently known.
Thus, in this paper, we focused our discussion on complete orderings. De-
spite our focus on complete orderings, our techniques can (with appropriate
choice of reference measure) be generalized to the weaker case: all of the
model statistics that we present in Section 3 can be applied to partially or-
dered network data without modification, because they only make references
to the network of interest through the indicator y·: ·· (1).
7 Conclusion
Rank-order data are a cornerstone of sociometric measurement, but prin-
cipled treatment of such data in an interpersonal context poses significant
statistical challenges. Here, we have shown how statistical exponential fami-
lies may be used to generalize the now well-known ERGM framework to the
rank-order case. We have also introduced a corresponding set of sufficient
statistics that are appropriate for use when only within-ego ordinal judg-
ments are psychologically meaningful, a restriction that is important when
modeling such data. As with conventional ERGMs, a wide range of statistics
may be posited to capture alternative psychological and social mechanisms;
the ability to evaluate and compare competing models based on such distinct
alternatives is one of the strengths of the statistical approach.
Given the current wave of interest in “large” networks, computationally
scalable estimation has been an increasing focus of research in the social
network community. Relative to population-scale networks, the networks
considered here have been fairly small (i.e., 10s of vertices), and our focus
has been on developing methods that work well on this latter scale. This
focus is motivated by the fact that sociometric data of the form treated here
is typically of interest only in group or organizational settings in which all
members of the network are salient and well-known to each other; since such
networks are by nature fairly small (e.g., rarely larger than 20–50 persons),
highly scalable techniques are less critical for rank-order models than for bi-
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nary networks. That said, computationally scalable estimation (particularly
for the above-described top-k design) is an interesting challenge for future
research in this area.
In our assumption that the network must be modeled through y·: ··, we
have discarded any information associated with the rank as such. Where
measurements are truly ordinal, this is the appropriate choice; nevertheless,
it has been noted e.g. by Levine (1993) that putatively ordinal data can in
practice contain more information than a strict ordinal interpretation would
allow. As we show in our example in Section 5.2, rank values and rank differ-
ences can be incorporated into the models as well, though that example only
uses them exogenously. Our framework does not, fundamentally, preclude in-
corporating such effects, and, in fact, it permits separating and testing their
significance over and above the purely comparison-based effects. This, also,
is a subject for ongoing work.
Finally, we note that development of ERGMs for rank-order data opens
the way to a rich family of novel statistical models for phenomena such as
interdependent choice behavior in group context, social influence on pref-
erences, etc. Particularly because of their suitability for data collected in
observational settings, rank-order ERGMs provide a useful tool for consid-
ering both new and classic problems in social psychology and the study of
decision making.
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Appendix: Overview of Monte Carlo MLE
and a simple sampling algorithm for a com-
plete ranking ERGM
In this appendix, we review the basic algorithm of Geyer and Thompson
(1992), its application to ERGMs for dichotomous data by Hunter and Hand-
cock (2006), and its extension to valued ERGMs by Krivitsky (2012), and
outline the Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling algorithm that it requires
for rank data.
The challenge in fitting the model specified by (3) is that the likelihood
contains an intractable normalizing constant (4), which is a summation over
a large, finite sample space of cardinality {(n−1)!}n. This summation can be
approximated using importance sampling Monte Carlo integration. In prac-
tice, this is highly inefficient. For the purposes of likelihood maximization,
however, it suffices to approximate the ratio of the normalizing constants, i.e.,
κg(θ
′)/κg(θ) for some two parameter configurations θ
′ and θ: maximizing
Prθ′;g(Y = y)
Prθ;g(Y = y)
=
exp{θ′ · g(y)}
κg(θ
′)
/
exp{θ · g(y)}
κg(θ)
=
exp{θ′ · g(y)}
exp{θ · g(y)}
/
κg(θ
′)
κg(θ)
(A1)
with respect to θ′ will produce the MLE as well as maximizing Prθ′;g(Y = y)
itself would.
In estimating this ratio, in particular, for a given ERGM configuration
θ′, it makes sense to use a proposal distribution from the same family, with a
similar θ, which, for an exponential family in particular, simplifies as follows:
κg(θ
′)
κg(θ)
=
∑
y∈Y exp{θ′ · g(y)}
κg(θ)
=
∑
y∈Y exp{(θ′ − θ) · g(y)} exp{θ · g(y)}
κg(θ)
=
∑
y∈Y
exp{(θ′ − θ) · g(y)}exp{θ · g(y)}
κg(θ)
. (A2)
Now, exp{θ · g(y)}/κg(θ) is just Prθ;g(Y = y), making (A2) an expectation
of exp{(θ′ − θ) ·g(Y )} under Y ∼ Prθ;g(·), so the ratio can be approximated
simply with
κg(θ
′)
κg(θ)
= Eθ;g [exp{(θ′ − θ) · g(Y )}] ≈ 1
S
S∑
s=1
exp{(θ′ − θ) · g(Y (s))}, (A3)
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given a sample Y (1), . . . ,Y (S) drawn from Prθ;g(·) for a given guess θ. The
accuracy of approximation (A3) decreases as θ′ draws father from θ, because
the greater the difference between them, the greater the variance of the quan-
tity in the exponent of (A3), so, in practice, a starting guess θ(0) is selected,
sampled from, used to maximize (A1) to produce a new guess θ(1), which is
in turn used to draw a new sample, and so on until convergence.
Notice that (A3) only depends on Y (s) through its vector of sufficient
statistics g(Y (s)). This means that once the sample is drawn, the maximiza-
tion is agnostic to nature of the data or the structure of the sample space
Y , depending only on the sufficient statistics. In practice, this reduces its
storage requirements and greatly simplifies convergence and other diagnos-
tics, and it means that developments such as those of Hummel et al. (2012)
to improve stability and accuracy of the estimation can be applied directly.
We use them here as well.
To obtain such a sample, we use a Metropolis sampling algorithm (Algo-
rithm 1). At every iteration, an ego is chosen at random and a symmetric
proposal to swap the rankings of two of its alters (also chosen at random) is
made. Any permutation of n− 1 alters for each ego can be reached from any
other permutation in at most n − 2 swaps, and the sample space is finite,
guaranteeing ergodicity.
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Algorithm 1 Sampling from a complete rank ERGM
Let:
RandomChoose(A) return a random element of a set A
Uniform(a, b) return a random draw from the Uniform(a, b)
distribution
Require: y(0) ∈ Y , S sufficiently large, N , g(·), θ
Ensure: a draw from a complete ranking ERGM Prθ;g(·)
1: for s← {1 .. S} do
2: i← RandomChoose(N) {Select an ego at random.}
3: j ← RandomChoose(N\ {i}) {Propose one alter.}
4: j′ ← RandomChoose(N\ {i, j}) {Propose another alter.}
5: y∗ ← (y(s−1))i: jj′ {Propose a swap.}
6: r ← exp [θ · {g(y∗)− g(y(s−1))}]
7: u← Uniform(0, 1)
8: if u < r then
9: y(s) ← y∗ {Accept the proposal.}
10: else
11: y(s) ← y(s−1) {Reject the proposal.}
12: return y(S)
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